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Abstract   In this paper, we present a spatial model of fishing that can be used
to assess some of the economic welfare losses to producers from setting aside
essential fish habitat (EFH) areas. The paper demonstrates how spatially ex-
plicit behavioral models of fishing are estimated, how these models can be used
to measure welfare losses to fishermen, and how these models can then, in turn,
be used to simulate fishing behavior. In developing the spatial model of fishing
behavior, the work incorporates ideas of congestion and information effects, and
we show a modification of standard welfare measures that accounts for these
spillover effects. Using this methodology, these effects are traced through to the
policy simulations, where we demonstrate how these welfare and predicted
shares need to be modified to account for spillover effects from fleet activity.
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Introduction
The Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996, Public Law 104-267, amended the
Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Conservation and Management Act to establish new re-
quirements for protecting or restoring essential fish habitat (EFH). Under the Act,
EFH is defined as “those waters and substrate necessary to fish for spawning, breed-
ing, feeding, or growth to maturity” (Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Conservation and
Management Act, section 3). An EFH consultation with NOAA Fisheries is required
of all federal agencies undertaking, permitting, or funding activities that may ad-
versely affect EFH, regardless of its location.
Under the Sustainable Fisheries Act, all federal fishery management councils
Robert L. Hicks is an assistant professor in the Department of Economics, Morton Hall, The College of
William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795 USA, email: rlhick@wm.edu. James Kirkley is a pro-
fessor in the Department of Coastal and Ocean Policy, Virginia Institute of Marine Science, The College
of William and Mary, Gloucester Point, VA 23062 USA, email: jkirkley@vims.edu. Ivar E. Strand, Jr. is
a professor emeritus in the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 2200 Symons Hall,
University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742 USA, email: ivars@arec.umd.edu.Hicks, Kirkley, and Strand 114
must take appropriate steps to minimize the potentially adverse impacts of fishing
on EFH. This may be accomplished by imposing management measures including,
but not limited to, fishing equipment restrictions, time/area closures, and harvest
limits. Assessing the potential economic ramifications of regulatory options de-
signed to protect or restore EFH may be extremely complicated. The major
complication is the absence of information relating the quality or condition of EFH
to future fishing activities. The dynamics and interactions between EFH and future
resource abundance, availability, and levels are generally unknown.
Beginning in 2000, the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council (the Coun-
cil) became concerned with EFH issues relating to the surfclam and ocean quahog
fisheries. The Council was preparing Amendment 13, which was to change the quota
levels for the fisheries. As per the requirements of the Sustainable Fisheries Act, the
Council proposed several EFH areas, and drafted four potential closure options to
protect EFH. The draft Regulatory Impact Review for establishing the EFH, how-
ever, was rejected because the Council failed to adequately consider the possible
economic ramifications that might result from the four proposed closed areas, as
well as the option of no change or the status quo.
In this paper, we investigate how a spatial model of fishing can be used to as-
sess some of the economic welfare losses to producers from setting aside EFH areas.
Since no solid evidence exists concerning the biological effects of EFH designa-
tions, we present a limited assessment of the potential, short-run economic
ramifications of regulatory options—closed areas—designed to minimize the ad-
verse effects of surfclam (Spisula solidissima) and ocean quahog (Arctica islandica)
fishing on EFH. It is important to recognize this limitation because a short-run
analysis is likely to predict only negative consequences of options to protect EFH
(e.g., losses in producer welfare), when in fact, there may be substantial gains in net
benefits in the long run.
The paper demonstrates how spatially explicit behavioral models of fishing are
estimated, how these models can be used to measure welfare losses to fishermen,
and how these models can then, in turn, be used to simulate fishing behavior. In de-
veloping the spatial model of fishing behavior, the work incorporates ideas of
congestion and information effects, and we show how standard welfare measures
must be modified to account for these spillover effects. Using this methodology,
these effects are traced through to the policy simulations. While the use of proxy
measures for congestion and information has been done before, we demonstrate how
these site-specific attributes affect welfare and policy simulations. We also identify
those portions of the fleet most likely to change their homeport due to the EFH
regulations.
The Surfclam and Ocean Quahog Fisheries
Resource Distribution and the Commercial Fisheries
Surfclams and ocean quahogs are distributed in the Northwest Atlantic from the
Gulf of Saint Lawrence to Cape Hatteras (Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Coun-
cil 1998). Ocean quahogs, however, are also distributed from the Bay of Cadiz of
Southwest Spain intermittently across the North Atlantic. Both species are relatively
long lived—surfclams to about 35 years of age and ocean quahogs to over 100 years
of age. The ocean quahog is recognized as the longest living bivalve in the world.
The primary commercial gear used to harvest both species is the dredge.
Surfclam and ocean quahog vessels are generally designed and constructed exclu-
sively for harvesting surfclams and ocean quahogs, and thus, they cannot be easilyShort-run Welfare Losses from Essential Fish Habitat Designations 115
reconfigured to permit fishing in other fisheries. Since 1994, most of the landings of
surfclams from the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) have been taken from the Mid-
Atlantic region. Landings of ocean quahogs have been about evenly distributed
between the New England and Mid-Atlantic ranges. Recently, however, landings
from the Mid-Atlantic region have generally been higher than landings from the
New England region. Prior to 1990, both surfclams and ocean quahogs were also
harvested from Georges Bank. Since 1990, there have been no reported landings
from east of 69∞W longitude because Georges Bank has been closed due to the risk
of paralytic shellfish poisoning.
There are actually three distinct fisheries. There is the surfclam fishery, which is
primarily conducted in the Mid-Atlantic region. There is an ocean quahog fishery,
which is conducted in both the New England and Mid-Atlantic regions. There is also
a Maine and Rhode Island fishery for mahoganies, which are also ocean quahogs.
The Maine and Rhode Island fisheries land smaller quahogs for the live market;
these clams generally compete with the inshore hard clam or quahog, which often
may be sold as topnecks, little necks, and cherrystone clams.
Product Markets, Pricing, and Production
The primary use of surfclams has been in the “strip market” to produce fried clams.
In recent years, however, surfclams have been increasingly used in chopped or
ground form for other products (e.g., high-quality soups and chowders). In contrast,
ocean quahogs are generally viewed as a lower-valued product; the primary uses of
quahogs have been soups, chowders, and white sauces. Quahog meat has a sharper
taste and darker color than surfclams, which is why they have not been used in the
more lucrative strip market. In 2000, the average ex-vessel price for surfclams was
approximately $8.39 per bushel, while the average annual price for ocean quahogs
was about $4.30 per bushel. The mahoganies typically command a much higher
price. In 2000, the average ex-vessel price for mahoganies was $27.44 per bushel.
In 1991, there were 121 vessels in the surfclam and ocean quahog fisheries; 47
of the 121 vessels landed both surfclams and quahogs. In 2000, there were 82 ves-
sels in the surfclam and quahog fisheries, and only 12 vessels landed both surfclams
and ocean quahogs. During the 1980s and early 1990s, vessels tended to jointly ex-
ploit surfclams and ocean quahogs. Since 1995, the percentage of the fleet
exploiting both species has dropped to below 30%. The primary reason for the con-
traction was probably good management.
Management of the Fisheries
Management of the fisheries is under the primary responsibility of the Council.
Prior to 1990, the fisheries were regulated by a series of command and control regu-
lations (e.g., annual and quarterly quotas, minimum sizes, gear and effort
restrictions, and limited entry). In 1990, the Council established an individual trans-
ferable quota (ITQ) program to manage the fisheries. Permits and ITQs pertain only
to surfclams and ocean quahogs; they do not permit harvesting any other species. In
addition, surfclam and quahog vessels are designed such that, without very expen-
sive reconfigurations, they cannot harvest other species. The original ITQ program
excluded the Maine quahog fishery because the Maine fishery did not extend to the
EEZ at that time. It was subsequently discovered, however, that the Maine fishery
was moving into the EEZ, and in 1998, the Council implemented an ITQ program
for the Maine fishery.Hicks, Kirkley, and Strand 116
Spatial Model of Fishing
A Framework for Assessing Short-run Welfare Losses
The usage of closed areas to protect EFH has the potential to cause substantial re-
ductions in production or landings, ex-vessel revenues, profits, and producer
welfare. With closed areas, it would be expected that fishing operators would reallo-
cate their effort spatially in order to minimize the impacts of a closure. It would also
be expected that pre-EFH closed area strategies reflected decisions representing op-
timal spatial choices. The need for operators to change fishing areas, thus, would be
expected to reduce producer welfare in the short run. In the section, we present a
framework for analyzing the potential short-run welfare losses associated with the
various spatial closures considered by the council.
Spatial Choice, Congestion, and Assessing Welfare Losses
There is growing literature on estimating the potential economic benefits and costs
of area management (Eales and Wilen 1986; Dupont 1993; Curtis 1999; Holland and
Sutinen 1999, 2000; Curtis and Hicks 2000; Smith 2002; Wilen et al. 2002; and
Smith and Wilen 2003 a,b). The analytical framework we offer, therefore, adapts
this methodology to analyze changes to producer welfare losses from EFH designa-
tions. We initially develop a spatial choice model, which describes how fishermen
choose fishing areas, to assess the losses in short-run welfare.1
One feature of our model is the introduction of potential congestion effects
caused by concentrating fishing effort by closing certain areas of the ocean. The im-
plication of including concentration effects in the model of commercial fishermen’s
spatial choice is explored particularly for the case of policy analysis and welfare
measurement. The model is then used to estimate the loss in economic value to com-
mercial fishermen associated with closing areas of the ocean.
We analyze four potential area closures proposed by the Council to protect EFH.
The four EFH designated areas, however, are important not only for surfclams and
ocean quahogs, but also to numerous other marine species (e.g., summer flounder,
sea scallops, monkfish, and American lobster). The four options, or potential closed
areas, are as follows: (i) Option 2 proposes to prohibit clam dredging on Georges
Bank east of 69∞; (ii) Option 3 proposes to prohibit dredging east of 70∞, 20 min-
utes; (iii) Option 6 prohibits dredging in the tilefish habitat areas of particular
concern (HAPC), which is characterized as the depths between 250 and 1,200 feet
between Cape Cod, Massachusetts, and Cape May, New Jersey; and (iv) Option 8
closes the western extent of the Maine quahog fishery in the EEZ.2
Our analysis is limited to only the surfclam and ocean quahog fleets. We do not
consider the potential impacts on other fisheries. An important aspect of analyzing
the potential economic ramifications of the closed area options is the determination
1 We remind the reader that, depending upon the ecological system, it is possible that there could be
“double dividends” associated with reserve creation (Sanchirico and Wilen 2001; Holland and Brazee
1996; and Hannesson 1998), where both harvests and stocks increase. It is also possible that preserve
creation does relatively little for the stock. For this fishery, there is a paucity of scientific evidence con-
cerning the intertemporal impacts of preserve creation. Our analysis, therefore, should be thought of as a
short-run examination of the costs of preserve creation.
2 The Council originally considered eight options. Several of these were rejected early on in the process.
The four considered options discussed in this paper (2, 3, 6, and 8) retain the numbering scheme sug-
gested by the Council for the sake of comparability.Short-run Welfare Losses from Essential Fish Habitat Designations 117
of the likely behavior of fishermen relative to selecting where to fish in the presence
of spatial closures. We address the issue of area selection by developing an econo-
metric model that relates fishing area choice to areas’ expected revenues, costs, and
potential congestion from other vessels.
Data and Model Development
The data used to estimate the model and conduct the economic analysis was logbook
data. This data places fishermen in a 10-minute square, and provides information
necessary for model specification. In particular, the logbook data provides informa-
tion for characterizing historic averages by month for each area of landings per unit
effort (LPUE), fishing time (TIME), the variance of area-specific net revenues
(VAR), and the number of trips in the preceding 30 days (FLEET). Furthermore, the
data can be used to characterize a vessel’s homeport,3 which is used as a basis to
calculate distances to each area under consideration by the fisherman.
Defining fishing areas is an important step in formulating the econometric
model of fishing site choice. We initially consider fishing areas to correspond to 10-
minute squares because this is the common geographic scale used in data collection
for the fishery. For the period 1996–2000, clam (quahog) fishermen were observed
fishing in 160 (279) unique 10-minute square areas. For our estimation, we need
monthly averages for LPUE, VAR, and TIME, and monthly totals for FLEET for a
total of 12 x 160 (279) area-specific data points for each variable. Clearly, increas-
ing the number of areas that must be included in the model increases the information
requirements and risks spreading historical data “too thin” when trying to character-
ize area-specific information. For these reasons, choice areas were defined based on
30-minute squares, which decreased the number of areas relative to areas defined by
10-minute squares. The use of 30-minute square areas also increases the level of
geographic aggregation in the model. We eliminated areas that were visited spar-
ingly (or not at all) by fishermen, because it was thought that inclusion of these
areas would not yield results applicable to the four closed area options.4
Additionally, for the clam and Mid-Atlantic quahog fisheries, a vessel’s choice
set was defined based upon distance from their homeport. For the clam fishery,
larger vessels’ (class 2 or 3) choice sets were restricted as those viable 30-minute
square areas within 100 miles, while class 1 vessels were restricted to those areas
within 40 miles of their port. For the Mid-Atlantic quahog fishery, class 3 vessel
choice sets were restricted as those viable 30-minute square areas within 150 miles,
class 2 vessels were restricted to those areas within 130 miles, and class 1 vessels
were restricted to areas within 60 miles of their port. Because the Maine quahog
fishery is so geographically compact, all feasible areas were within close range of
homeports. These cutoff distances were determined by examining observed one-way
distances in the data by vessel size. The reader should note that reducing the spatial
extent of the choice set by distance may arbitrarily eliminate viable substitute areas.
For a discussion on the implications of choice set boundaries on welfare measures in
a recreation demand context, see Haab and Hicks (1997), Hicks and Strand (2000),
Haab and Hicks (1999), and Parsons and Hauber (1998).
3 Because there is no clear definition of the point of departure for each trip in the logbook data, we use
the port of landing (for years 1996–2000) and calculate homeport based upon plurality, since nearly all
vessels ended a vast majority of trips at the same port.
4 Sites with fewer than five trips per year, on average, for the period 1996–2000 were eliminated as an
area in an attempt to ensure that results would apply to the most recent time period.Hicks, Kirkley, and Strand 118
Fishing activities between 1996 and 2000, related to surfclams, ocean quahogs,
and mahoganies, were widely distributed between Maine and Virginia (figures 1-3);
the numbered areas in figures 1-3 pertain to 30-minute squares included in the spa-
tial choice set. The dark areas represent a higher concentration of fishing. Based
upon the rules for defining the choice set previously discussed, the surfclam, ocean
quahog, and Maine quahog had on average 14.33, 21.92, and 7 areas from which
fishermen in the respective fisheries could choose.
Comparing figures 1, 2, and 3 illustrates that the Maine fishery is the most geo-
graphically compact, while the Mid-Atlantic quahog fishery covers significantly
more ground with major activity occurring off the coastline from Maryland to Mas-
sachusetts. The surfclam fishery, on the other hand, concentrates most of its activity
off the coasts of New Jersey and Delaware.
The Council proposed four EFH areas (referred to as Options 2, 3, 6, and 8) to
protect surfclams, ocean quahogs, and other species. Since the area closure defini-
tions overlapped some 30-minute squares, we were not able to precisely match the
proposed closed areas’ coordinates to our definition of the spatial choice set, we
chose to close the entire 30-minute square area. Where small parts of a 30-minute
square area were affected by a closure (e.g., the Option 6 closure is an example), an
analysis of a larger closure was undertaken since our analysis assumed the entire
area was off limits to fishing. Consequently, our analysis yields a worst case, or up-
per bound estimate of the impact of the various options on fishermen.
Figure 1.  Clam Actual Trips (1996–2000) and Definition of Choice SetShort-run Welfare Losses from Essential Fish Habitat Designations 119
Figure 2.  Quahog Actual Trips (1996–2000) and Definition of Choice Set
Figure 3.  Maine Quahog Actual Trips (1996–2000) and Definition of Choice SetHicks, Kirkley, and Strand 120
The Spatial Choice Model
Fishermen likely choose areas based upon factors related to site profitability: the
LPUE per unit time in an area, the expected length of time spent fishing (TIME),
and the distance to the fishing site (DISTANCE). Furthermore, the fisherman might
likely consider variability (either in terms of LPUE, TIME, or both) when compar-
ing one area to another. Additionally, there is the possibility that some fishermen
will avoid some areas because of possible congestion associated with having too
many fishing boats on a given fishing ground. Consequently, fishermen are likely to
examine how many boats have been or are in the area. For our analysis, we use the
number of vessels (FLEET) and the number of vessels squared (FLEET2) in the area
during the preceding 30 days as a proxy for congestion. Admittedly, this proxy of
congestion is also likely capturing information effects. However, given a paucity of
data on how fishermen share information versus avoid congestion, we feel that this
provides a reasonable approach for capturing congestion at high levels of fleet activ-
ity. The challenge is to estimate a fisherman’s decision rule for choosing areas that
balance these area-specific factors.
The area choice model we use was initially proposed by Hanemann (1982) and
adapted to fisheries by Bockstael and Opaluch (1983). The model allows for the es-
timation of decision rules of fishing area choice that incorporates factors important
for the choice including the relative “riskiness” of different fishing areas. This is particu-
larly useful for quantifying the tradeoffs fishermen make with respect to factors they
consider when choosing one fishing area over others. In our application of Hanemann’s
model, fishermen are assumed to choose the best site by considering site-specific infor-
mation such as LPUE, variability of profits, distance to the site, etc. Fishermen
choose the best site from among n alternatives each having uncertain returns.
The work of Bockstael and Opaluch (1983) assumes economic decisionmakers
are expected utility maximizers whose expected utility has a mean-variance func-
tional form. Performing a Taylor series expansion of the individual’s utility function
































where Wo = the fisherman’s initial level of wealth, and E(pj) = mean net revenues at
site j. By selecting a functional form, taking the expected value of this function, re-
stricting the utility function to depend only upon the mean and variance, and
subsequently parameterizing the equation to conform to a random utility framework,
we derive an equation that can be estimated:
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Equation (1¢) is a reduced form of how fleet size should enter the indirect utility
function. Notice that the error term, ej, is site-specific. The fisherman then chooses
site i if the site is the best place to fish out of the set of all possible fishing choices, S:
EU W EU W i j S ij () ( >" ˛ ) , .   Short-run Welfare Losses from Essential Fish Habitat Designations 121
Assuming that the area-specific area terms, ej, are distributed as Type I General-














Using maximum likelihood techniques, we can recover the parameters a, b, d, and f
and predict the redistribution of trips following closures. A priori, we expect a > 0,
b < 0, d > 0, and f < 0, since all things equal, anglers would choose sites with
higher expected profits or lower variability. We expect that the effect of vessel activ-
ity would be positive at lower levels, since the presence of other vessels might
indicate to the captain that successful fishing operations are being undertaken at an
area. However, when the number of trips exceeds some threshold level, the effect of
congestion is felt and fishermen are less likely to choose that alternative.
Mean profits (net of fishing and steaming travel costs) at each area were calcu-
lated by month to yield an estimate of E(pj). Profit levels per vessel were estimated
using cost information available in McCay and Brandt (2001). From McCay and
Brandt, we calculated average cost relationships for the three fisheries considered
here. Specifically, it was determined that steam costs were, on average, $6.40/mile
for the surfclam fleet and $5.52/mile for the Maine and Mid-Atlantic quahog fleets.
Additionally, it was determined that dredge time for the two fleets costs approxi-
mately $40/hour once on the fishing grounds. Our estimate of E(pj) for the Maine
and Mid-Atlantic quahog fleet is calculated as follows:
E TIME quahog jj () ( ) p=
*( ) * ( ) $ $ . * . PRICE quahog LPUE quahog jj - [] - 40 6 40 DISTANCE
For the surfclam fleet, our estimate of E(pj) is:
E TIME surfclam jj () ( ) p=
*() * () $ $ . * . PRICE surfclam LPUE surfclam jj - [] - 40 6 40 DISTANCE
The variables TIME (average numbers of hours fished while on the fishing
grounds), PRICE (average price based upon a vessel’s homeport designation), LPUE
(the average catch per hour while on fishing grounds), and DISTANCE (the distance
from the vessel’s homeport designation to the center of the fishing ground) were cal-
culated using historical data for each of the three fisheries for the period 1996–2000
to yield per-month averages. We calculated the variance of pj for each month and
30-minute square area to yield Var(pj).
Following Hanemann (1982), the measurement of welfare changes can be ac-
complished via numerical methods by calculating the expected value of
compensation (C) for a closure of certain areas in the choice set that holds expected
maximum utility constant (with expectations taken over the site-specific error
terms):
VW E Var Fleet V W E C Var Fleet 00 0 0 0 10 0 0 1 + [] =+ + [] (), (), () , (), , pp p p (3)Hicks, Kirkley, and Strand 122
where the expected maximum utility (EMAX) for a choice occasion, Vk[W0 + E(p)0,
Var(p)0, Fleetk], is equal to:
EU WE C Var Fleet j S jj
k
j
k max ( ) , ( ) , , . 00 0 ++ [] +" ˛ {} [] pp e
5,6
Notice EMAX is taken over the original set of fishing alternatives S to yield V0 and
taken over only those sites remaining open after the EFH designation (S1) to yield
V1. Therefore, C is the amount of compensation necessary after the closure of some
sites to hold utility at a level as if the closures never happened. The expectations op-
erator of the EMAX function is the researcher’s expectation taken over ej.
The expected utility function (V1) depends on the fleet’s area choices post clo-
sure. This complicates the standard welfare analysis as typically used in applications of
the RUM model, since each vessel’s preferences depend on other choices in the fleet. To
account for this interrelationship, we employ an iterative procedure for reallocating the
fleet following a closure. The steps of this procedure are outlined below:
1. Assign initial guess for site-specific probability functions.
a) If this is iteration number one, the guess is simply the vector p0 using equation
(2) for each area. If an area is closed, the observed trip activity is reallocated
to other open areas proportionally to observed activity in the open areas.
b) If this is not the first iteration, the vector p1 (which is equal to p2 from pre-
vious iteration) is used.
2. Using the guess for the site-specific probabilities, calculate the updated pre-
diction for the expected values of FLEET and FLEET2 for each area and trip
in the data.
3. Using the updated values of FLEET and FLEET2 for each area, calculate the
updated predicted probability vector p2.
4. Repeat steps 2-3 until  pp 1 - 2  £ q (For this study, q was set at .001.).
5. Otherwise, assign the final values of FLEET and FLEET2 following the clo-
sure for each area. Calculate the final predicted choice probabilities (p).
Using the final predicted values of FLEET and FLEET2, then calculate the final es-
timate of V1 that incorporates congestion and information spillover effects.
The goal of the estimation problem is to recover structural parameters of the
individual’s utility function that reveal information about how fishing sites are cho-
sen. In order to implement equation (1¢), we estimated vessels’ initial wealth, W0;
expected profits, E(pj); and the variance of area-specific profits, Var(pj) for each
area considered by the fishermen. Following Bockstael and Opaluch (1983), we ap-
proximated W0 by the value of the vessel.7
5 To  solve for C, we employ the bisection method for finding roots for a one-dimensional equation.
While more efficient numerical methods may exist to find roots of an equation, we found equation (3)
converged quickly.
6 Work by McFadden (1995) and applied to recreation demand by Herriges and Kling (1999) has investi-
gated the bias associated with calculating welfare changes using the EMAX function when the indirect
utility function is nonlinear in income. We believe our approach using the EMAX function provides a
reasonable approximation for the short-run welfare loss of area closures, since these papers have not in-
vestigated this bias with our functional form and most policies impose a relatively small change in
individual’s choice opportunities.
7 Because of inadequate data on fishing firms’ current levels of wealth, we adopt the approach of Kitts,
Thunberg, and Robertson (2000), which demonstrates that the value of the vessel and gear (i.e., an ap-
proximate value of wealth) is approximately equal to one year’s gross stock or annual ex-vessel revenue.
This relationship is assumed to apply to the clam and quahog vessels in this fishery.Short-run Welfare Losses from Essential Fish Habitat Designations 123
Results and Policy Simulation
The results (table 1) confirm a priori beliefs about how fishermen balance the vari-
ous factors influencing fishing site choice. Fishermen were more likely to choose
sites that are more profitable (which could mean closer, less costly, or higher LPUE)
or less likely to choose sites with high variability. They were also more likely to
choose sites where a significant activity was occurring until the level of activity ex-
ceeded a threshold level and then they were less likely to choose sites. All results
were significant at the 5% level of significance, and the model likelihood ratio test
statistic (versus a model where all parameters are equal to zero) indicates that the
model is preferred at the 5% level of significance. Since one of the primary uses of
the model will be for predicting where fishermen will fish once area closures are en-
acted using equation (2), we also construct a goodness-of-fit measure by calculating
the percentage of observations where the model predicts the actual choices of indi-
viduals (based upon the observation with the highest calculated probability). Results
for this statistic show that relative to a naïve prediction of the inverse of the number
of choices in the choice set, each choice model predicts choices well.
Short-run Welfare Losses
In order to understand the impact of the potential EFH regulations on each of the
three fisheries, consider table 2. First, the table illustrates some variability in land-
ings and revenues during the years 1996–2000. We construct a status-quo or
reference level of permits (number of boats), trips, landings, revenues, and prices,
by taking the fleet average for the years 1996–2000. Rather than choose the latest
year in the data (2000), we felt that defining the fleet baseline level over a five-year
time period was a reasonable way to eliminate noise that might cause year-to-year
fluctuations that are not constructive to the analysis. The table also illustrates, in the
final four rows, that fleet activity for each of the EFH closure areas is minimal in
comparison to overall totals.
Of the four options, only Option 3 has potentially catastrophic effects, which
pertain to the Maine quahog fishery, because the entire fishing area for this fleet is
Table 1
Site Choice Model Parameter Estimates (t-statistics reported in parenthesis)
Parameter Clams Quahogs ME Quahogs
a 11.23 25.05 30.35
(19.01) (29.29) (11.23)
b –682.72 –50.77 –95.28
(14.13) (3.67) (4.32)
d 0.11 0.16 0.05
(84.67) (69.96) (57.36)
j –0.00071 –0.0018 –0.00011
(52.11) (37.97) (42.04)
c2 (all parms=0) 21,843.22 16,673.36 18,738.66
Average # Choices 14.33 21.92 7
% Predicted Correctly 37.74 25.74 74.01
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closed by this option. Options 3 and 6 have the potential to impact the quahog fish-
ery, since a significant number of vessels, trips, and revenues are derived from the
offshore areas impacted by Option 3. For the clam fishery, Options 3 and 6 will im-
pact fishing activities, but since the majority of activity does not occur so far
offshore, the impact is likely to be much smaller than the quahog fishery. Finally,
Option 8, which has ramifications only for the Maine quahog fishery, has only a
minimal impact on the Maine quahog or mahogany fishery. The 1996–2000 average
annual number of trips to the areas related to Option 8 equaled only 14, and thus,
the impacts of this option would be expected to be small.
Analyzing the effect of closures by looking at observed activity in areas does
provide context for who will be affected and how important EFH areas are for his-
toric fishing grounds. This type of analysis ignores, however, how fishermen might
respond to area closures. It is unlikely that they would completely stop fishing dur-
ing times usually spent fishing in EFH areas. Rather, it is more likely that they will
respond by shifting their effort to other areas. To model these types of reactions in
the context of our estimated behavioral parameters and model presented above re-
quires some modification from the standard welfare changes analysis. Notice that
the site-specific expected utility function (equation 1¢) includes the variables FLEET
and FLEET2, which are intended to capture the effect of other vessels’ choices on
the current choice for a vessel. As areas are closed due to EFH designations, the
fleet will re-optimize their location choices in order to maximize individual profits
given regulatory constraints. Consequently, the standard welfare analysis (in which
other decisionmakers’ choices do not affect a person’s current choice) must be
amended to accommodate the effect of information effects or crowding. In order to
model the welfare effects and choice probabilities, we conduct the iterative analysis
as described in the preceding section.
We use the model to estimate policy-relevant outputs that describe impacts and
likely responses from the EFH closures being considered. Changes in welfare were
calculated using equation (3). First, we calculate C, the welfare measure that equates
post-closure with the baseline pre-closure level of expected utility. This measure can
be thought of as an at-the-dock payment a fisherman facing the area closures would
need to be paid to compensate for the area closure. This payment would compensate
him for changing expenses relating to travel and fishing at a site, a change in LPUE
and variability of profits, and changing conditions with regard to fleet congestion
and information.
Consequently, the measure embodies all of the factors underlying the decision
rule presented in equation 1¢. For each of the policies, we calculate C per trip (table
3). First, Option 2 does not impact the spatial choice set of any of the three fisheries,
so there are no appreciable welfare changes to measure. Option 3 completely closes
the Maine quahog fishery and has some implications for the quahog fishery, since a
portion of its activity does occur a fair distance from shore. The clam fishery has
small measurable impacts since fishing grounds (for the area-choice analysis) are
mostly west of the cutoff line. The exception is for boats steaming out of the ports in
the northern range of the clam fishery (Rhode Island- and Massachusetts-based ves-
sels). These vessels are affected more than vessels based out of New Jersey or points
south. Option 6, which closes a significant area in the offshore areas of the Mid-At-
lantic region, has significant impacts (relative to per-trip revenues) on the quahog
fishery and, to a lesser degree, the clam fishery. Finally Option 8, has significant im-
pacts on the Maine quahog fishery, but has no effect on either of the Mid-Atlantic
fisheries.
It is important to note that even though most of these options had minor impacts
on fleet activity based upon historical fishing patterns, C compensates all fishermen
for the EFH closures as long as they have some probability of choosing an affectedHicks, Kirkley, and Strand 126
fishing site. In particular, this is important for the Maine Option 8 closure. Even though
relatively little activity is observed in EFH areas during the period 1996–2000, the spa-
tial extent of the fishery is quite small, and the closure affects an area where a large
number of fishermen have a relatively high predicted probability of choosing.
Using equation (2), we also predict likely vessel area choices resulting from the
closures. For quahogs, a significant portion of the reallocated effort occurs just west
of the closure area off the coast of southern Massachusetts and Rhode Island. The
clam fishery, largely unaffected, is predicted to maintain effort in the Mid-Atlantic
region on historical fishing grounds. Option 6 had an impact on the quahog fishery
because many of the Mid-Atlantic offshore areas were no longer available to fisher-
men. The predicted response is to move activity from the offshore areas inshore,
either northward toward Long Island and Rhode Island or westward toward New Jer-
sey. For clam fishermen, activity is predicted to concentrate in the nearer shore areas
off of New Jersey. Option 8, the closure of the western extent of the Maine quahog
fishery, is predicted to result in a higher concentration of vessels in the primary fish-
ing grounds.8
Table 4 contains an estimate of the total welfare impact for each of the EFH clo-
sures under the baseline quota levels assuming no changes in trips. These numbers
demonstrate the upper bound losses associated with imposing EFH restrictions. The
clam fishery is affected the least across all EFH options relative to the other fisher-
ies considered here. Quahogs (for Options 3 and 6) suffer a significant loss when
compared to total fleet revenues. Option 8 also significantly impacts the Maine fish-
ery with an economic welfare loss associated with the area closure to be a
significant portion of status quo revenues.
Recall that these welfare measures not only compensate fishermen for having to
reallocate their effort into less profitable areas, but it also accounts for fleet conges-
tion and variability of profits associated with areas. Consequently, as areas are
closed and fishermen reallocate their activity, such that a higher concentration of ef-
fort (e.g., Option 8 in Maine), fishermen have higher economic welfare loss.
Similarly, EFH closures might also force fishermen to select areas where the re-
source abundance is uncertain or landings per trip tend to be highly variable, and the
Table 3
Mean Welfare Change Per Trip
Policy Clams Quahogs ME Quahogs
Option 1: Status Quo No Impact No Impact No Impact
Option 2: Close Georges Bank No Impact No Impact No Impact
Option 3: Close waters east of 70d20m $2.01a $1,064.89 Complete Closure
   of Fisheryb
Option 6: Close Tilefish Area $70.89 $2,636.62 No Impact
Option 8: West of ME Zone 1 No Impact No Impact $888.06
Average Revenue per Trip $10,908.94 $8,088.59 $1,215.88
Notes:
a For a portion of observations (where port state was either Massachusetts or Rhode Island, Option 3
closed all of their feasible fishing options. For these vessels, no welfare effect could be calculated.
b Because this option closes all fishing grounds for the Maine quahog fishery, it is not mathematically
possible to calculate a welfare change for this policy.
8 Maps of predicted activity post-closure are available from the authors.Short-run Welfare Losses from Essential Fish Habitat Designations 127
welfare measure will compensate them for a greater impact since it takes into ac-
count all of the factors underlying the estimated decision rule.
Our proxy for congestion is undoubtedly entangled with information effects. If
better data were available to disentangle congestion and information, it is likely that
congestion effects would have been more pronounced in model estimates and policy
simulation scenarios.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have demonstrated how to move from conceptual models of site
choice to models of fishing behavior. These behavioral models may then be used to
measure changes in welfare and predicted shares resulting from EFH designations.
Our analysis demonstrates that short-run impacts on fishermen can be quite large.
Longer-term impacts might be dampened if the fleet moves to different ports or fish-
eries in an effort to lessen the impacts of the restrictive area closures. Also, there
may be substantial long-term benefits generated from EFH regulations. Because of
inadequate information, however, we were unable to consider those potential long-
term benefits. For two policies considered in this paper, some portion of the fleet
was essentially shut down; that is, their spatial choice set was closed completely.
The models presented here do not capture the welfare losses to these firms, since the
model makes no allowance for port changes or other longer-term changes that might
mitigate the effect of the closures.
The model we present offers a method of incorporating the effects of other
fisher’s choices into an individual’s choice model. Our model allows vessel opera-
tors to re-optimize their current choice when faced with closures by making a guess
as to what the rest of the fleet may do and then choose their best area accordingly.
Using such a model introduces some complications for welfare analysis and estimat-
ing post-policy spatial choice shares. We present a method for incorporating these
spillover effects into policy and welfare analysis. While crowding did not prove to
Table 4
Yearly Economic Impact from EFH options: No Trip Changes and No Change in Quotas
Per-trip Total
Fishery EFH Option Compensation (C)T rips Compensation
Surfclam Status Quo 0 2,114 0
Option 2 0 2,114 0
Option 3 $2 2,114 $4,228
Option 6 $71 2,114 $150,094
Option 8 0 2,114 0
Quahog Status Quo 0 2,137 0
Option 2 0 2,137 0
Option 3 $1,065 2,137 $2,275,905
Option 6 $2,637 2,137 $5,635,269
Option 8 0 2,137 0
ME Quahog Status Quo 0 1,898 0
Option 2 0 1,898 0
Option 3 Complete Closure 0 Complete Closure
Option 6 0 1,898 0
Option 8 $888 1,898 $1,685,424Hicks, Kirkley, and Strand 128
be a major driver of area choice in this case, there may be other fisheries for which
this could be a significant problem. For these fisheries, crowding must be included
in the analysis of EFH closures.
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